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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
Effects of the Two World Wars in Shaping 
African Colonial Soldiers’ Perceptions of Colonialism 
 
by 
 
Eric W. Schiff 
Master of Arts in African Studies 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Edmond Keller, Chair 
 
This study investigates the extent overseas military service of African colonial soldiers during 
the two World Wars altered their perceptions of Europeans, colonialism, and themselves. The 
subsequent impact of these changes is also explored. Soldiers of the French West African 
tirailleurs sénégalais in World War I and the British East African King’s African Rifles in 
World War II are both examined and compared over the course of their respective periods of 
service and return to civilian life. While the two World Wars provided significant opportunities 
for unprecedented numbers of African soldiers to formulate deeper assessments of their role and 
status in the colonial system than previously imaginable, using this newfound knowledge gained 
through military service overseas to undermine the European order was another matter. 
Ultimately, the experiences of colonial soldiers in World Wars I and II proved most notable for 
showcasing the hypocrisies that sustained colonialism.    
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Introduction 
 
 By definition, wars are the result of relationships that have broken down to such a degree 
that armed conflict becomes a recourse for problem solving. While their power of division is 
obvious, wars can also lead to the formation of unions and coalitions that may have seemed 
impossible prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In essence, this paper is about how the Two World 
Wars acted as vehicles for intimate contact between groups of Africans and Europeans who 
rarely shared such moments, and the subsequent implications of such interactions. This study 
focuses on the former group, examining to what extent the overseas service of African colonial 
troops in the two World Wars shaped their views of Europeans, Europe, and the institution of 
colonialism amongst these African soldiers and their communities upon returning home from 
combat.  
Research initially began as an investigation into the history of the King’s African Rifles 
(KAR), a twentieth-century colonial military regiment based in British East Africa, and how it 
acted as an agent of colonialism throughout the course of its existence. Notably, this initial 
research project emphasized World War II and its immediate aftermath, then emphasizing how 
KAR units were influenced by their service overseas. Interest in this subject led to the creation of 
an auxiliary research paper on the tirailleurs sénégalais1 and Moroccan Goumiers,2 colonial 
soldiers of French West Africa who fought in World Wars I and II, respectively. Later on, this 
paper would be abridged through removal of the section on the Goumiers and adapted into this 
greater research project. As such, the structure of the paper is essentially a comparative analysis 
 
1 Designation for infantry recruited in the French colonial territories during the 19th and 20th centuries from the 
colony of Senegal. 
 
2 Indigenous Moroccan Muslim soldiers who served in auxiliary units attached to the French Army of Africa 
between 1908 and 1956. 
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of these two case studies, utilizing similarities and differences between the tirailleurs in World 
War I and the KAR in World War II to explore some of the larger questions at hand about 
colonialism and colonial military service. The comparative approach is the selected method of 
analysis for several reasons, the primary one being its ability to show trends and commonalities 
in a way that a single example cannot. As this paper hopes to demonstrate, the stories of the 
tirailleurs sénégalais and King’s African Rifles paralleled each other in many ways, with both 
groups of colonial soldiers sent overseas in a World War to fight for causes they could hardly 
call their own. Furthermore, in both cases overseas service brought about large, if not radical, 
shifts in perceptions about how these soldiers started to view Europeans and their cultures, 
institutions, and justifications of colonialism. While differences did exist between which World 
War the colonial units fought in, the European powers they fought under, and region of the globe 
they fought in, these dissimilarities proved useful for judging which aspects of overseas service 
were tied to factors unique to either the tirailleur or KAR and which aspects carried over in more 
universal ways. Additionally, by examining two groups of colonial soldiers that are usually 
studied in isolation of one another this approach hopes to discern overarching themes of overseas 
colonial service that might otherwise be overlooked.  
The initial hypothesis of this thesis was that colonial soldier perceptions not only were 
changed by their wartime experiences but that these shifting perceptions also had a substantial 
impact in Africa after their respective wars ended. Changing perceptions were measured by first  
distinguishing what were the common views of Europeans and colonialism in the regions 
tirailleurs sénégalais and King’s African Rifles soldiers were recruited from before the start of 
their respective World Wars, then contrasting these initial views with those stated by soldiers of 
these two units after they returned from overseas service. Likewise, post-war impact was 
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measured by the direct and indirect effects colonial soldiers had on their respective colonial 
governments upon their return from military service. After research was completed, it became 
clear that only the first half of this thesis was correct. In most cases African perceptions were 
fundamentally altered through military service abroad, with their views on the aforementioned 
subjects generally evolving from simplistic and ill-informed to significantly more intricate and 
nuanced over the course of their service. However, these shifts in perceptions altered only in 
limited ways their ability to bring about change after each war. The reasons for this lack of 
impact are complex, though the efforts of colonial governments after both World Wars was 
perhaps the largest explanations for this outcome. 
 Historical evidence for this research paper comes from a variety of sources. Difficulties 
in obtaining written and oral accounts from African colonial soldiers of the tirailleurs sénégalais 
and KAR means there is a leaning towards secondary sources in each chapter. Alongside these 
secondary sources are a number of primary documents from media such as journals, cartoons, 
and newspapers of the periods studied. For primary sources of European origin as well as older 
secondary sources there has been a conscientious attempt to ‘read between the lines’ and work 
around the biases inherent to these documents and accurately reconstruct the experiences of the 
studied colonial subjects. 
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Chapter One: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais on World War I’s Western Front 
 
This opening chapter focuses on the West African soldiers of the French colonial army, 
in particular the tirailleurs sénégalais who fought in the First World War. Broken down into 
three main sections, the chapter begins with a brief history of the tirailleurs sénégalais, as well 
as a general overview on what most West Africans thought of Europeans prior to World War I 
and why the French sought to introduce colonial soldiers on the Western Front. The following 
section concentrates on World War I and soldier experiences overseas, specifically the West 
Africans ‘recruited’ to fight for the French in Europe. The final section covers the changes in 
these soldiers’ perceptions that took place in the course of war and the effects these shifts in 
views had in the post-war era.  
As the only African soldiers to fight overseas in Europe, the experiences of the tirailleurs 
sénégalais on the Western Front offer a unique African perspective on World War I. 
Specifically, these soldiers were able to not only meet with both French soldiers and civilians but 
many also formed relationships with these French people that far surpassed virtually all African-
European relations on the African continent. Thanks to these uncommon experiences, the 
tirailleurs sénégalais came back from the war with a different, more nuanced understanding of 
the French compared to their peers who did not serve overseas. They were able to see the French, 
their rule, and the overall colonial experience not as something invulnerable or inevitable but 
very much built on unnatural, fallible, and fragile principles. Their service was part of a greater 
trend to mobilize and utilize African manpower by European powers during the conflict. World 
War I brought about increasing connections between Europeans and Africans, with the role of 
African soldiers stationed overseas being amongst, if not the first, group of African people from 
non-elite backgrounds to visit the European continent in large numbers. As the following 
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sections will show, interactions these soldiers had with the French and Europeans proved highly 
formative. While the need to exploit such manpower and resources during the war led to 
increased structural capacities and greater European control over their colonies in the interwar 
period, these soldiers’ experiences would ultimately prove to be a forerunner of the later colonial 
soldier experiences in World War II that would play a greater role facilitating decolonialization.  
 
Historical Background on the Tirailleurs Sénégalais: Prior to World War I, the usage 
of colonial soldiers by Europeans throughout Africa was generally limited to the internal 
policing of individual colonies. These forces tended to be small in number and typically 
consisted of men motivated to fight primarily by the economic incentives tied to military service 
in the early colonial systems.3 The tirailleurs sénégalais were no exception. Officially founded 
in 1857 by Louis Léon Faidherbes, they went from being a group of soldiers numbering around 
3000 before 1900 and less than 10,000 a decade later to swelling up to some 180,000 troops 
during the First World War.4 As historian Myron Echenberg describes, World War I effectively 
transformed the tirailleurs sénégalais from “a small conquest army of largely slave 
mercenaries... into a mass army of conscripts drawn from virtually every level of West African 
society.”5  Though their roots were in Senegal and neighboring colonial territories, the 
tirailleurs sénégalais came to refer to virtually all French colonial infantry troops from West 
 
3 Balesi, From Adversaries to Comrades-in-Arms, 31 
 
4 Ibid, 5-6; United States, Colonial Army Systems, 76 
 
5 Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts, 26 
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Africa. In fact, only around 30,000 or so of the tirailleurs sénégalais in World War I actually 
came from Senegal itself.6  
Meanwhile, perceptions of the French by West Africans in the decades before World War 
I were subject by a number of limiting factors. First and foremost, it is important to note that 
West African perceptions of the French did not just emerge out of the colonial moment but were 
also shaped by the centuries of the slave trade that had predated colonialism in the region. 
Additionally, most West Africans living in rural areas never actually saw or directly dealt with 
Europeans and had to rely on secondhand knowledge for an idea of what the French and France 
were like. Rural people in French West Africa primarily felt the pre-war colonial regime through 
taxes, the most important being a ‘head tax’ on individuals. Demands for manual labor from men 
and sexual exploitation of women by French administrators were two other sources of direct 
African-European interaction, while the indirect growth of the export economy was a fourth 
notable source of influence.7 Colonial towns on the West African interior saw little more 
European contact than their rural counterparts, with the towns’ small European populations and 
relative isolation limiting the amount of actual communication between Africans and the 
French.8 One of the few places where Africans did come into contact with Europeans on a 
regular basis were in major coastal cities such as the “Four Communes” of Senegal.9 The 
communes of Dakar, Rufisque, St. Louis, and Gorée housed some eighty-five percent of all 
Europeans in Senegal and the original African inhabitants of these areas were granted unique 
 
6 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 37 
 
7 Ibid, 12-17 
 
8 Ibid, 17-21 
 
9 These were the four oldest colonial towns in French West Africa. 
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status as originaires.10 This status gave them rights to voting and immunities to taxes that only 
they were afforded, much to the chagrin of colonial authorities in these areas.11  
Regardless of where they were encountered, French in the prewar period were described 
by West Africans as arrogant and abusive of their virtually unlimited repressive power. 
Unsurprisingly, West Africans were wary of and tried to avoid contact with the French at all 
costs due to this nasty reputation. Furthermore, with a dearth of information on the French 
available the end result was skewed and heavily biased stories of what was true about them. The 
French had little incentive to give accurate information on the subject of Europeans to their 
African counterparts and were happy to foster all sorts of exaggerated notions about themselves 
in order to solidify French colonial rule.  Overall, the period was notable for its limited contact 
between the two sides as well as the brutal French actions and general powerlessness of West 
Africans when such encounters did take place.12  
 While all European powers would leverage the use of their African colonies during 
World War I, only the French considered and eventually implemented the use of African colonial 
soldiers in Europe during World War I. The reasons for France’s unique decision arose partially 
from the nation’s relative tolerance of Africans peoples compared to their European counterparts 
and partially due to France fighting the war on her own territory and being particularly 
challenged for resources and manpower. Arguably the critical push leading to the presence of 
African soldiers in France came from the relentless campaigning of a French General by the 
name of Charles Mangin. At the time, a huge issue pressing the French publics’ conscience was 
 
10 Most of the African population of the Four Communes were termed originaires: those Africans born into the 
commune, but who retained recourse to African traditions. 
 
11 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 18 
 
12 Ibid, 20-21, 24-26 
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the growing demographic imbalance between their country and neighboring Germany. As the 
two countries continued on opposite demographic paths prior to the war the calls for France to 
look for solutions grew. Mangin was the foremost proponent for turning the French West African 
forces from a small army that dealt with local issues to a much larger force that could fight 
outside of their local territory and help make up for both real and perceived manpower 
shortcomings in the imperial French Army. His work La Force noire, published in 1910, played 
a major role in eventually bringing about the creation of a West African fighting force.13 
It is important to note how the French, despite generally holding Africans in better regard 
than other European powers, still had many racist and deeply-ingrained beliefs that guided their 
nation’s ideology and policies towards Africans. General Mangin’s assertions that West Africans 
could make good soldiers was born not out of a belief in human equality but instead from an 
interpretation of biological determinism and martial race theory that asserted some Africans were 
naturally inclined to be warlike and therefore could become highly capable soldiers. These 
perceived attributes included greater resistances to harsh climates, tolerating carrying heavy 
loads over long distances, enduring pain thanks to a less-developed nervous system, and 
familiarity to hieratical systems similar to the military. As colonial soldiers would discover, these 
‘positive’ traits Europeans were willing to attribute them with conveniently allowed them to fill 
some of the most dangerous and least desirable jobs within the military. In the case of the West 
Africans that fought under the French in World War I this meant frontline action as shock troops 
since Mangin and others believed groups of West Africans like those in Senegal made ideal 
soldiers for such missions.14 As a result, well over ninety percent of Senegalese recruited during 
 
13 Balesi, From Adversaries to Comrades-in-Arms, 66-67 
 
14 Lunn, “Les Races Guerrières,” 519-521 
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the war were classified as ‘warriors’ (guerriers) and mobilized as frontline soldiers.15 Scholarly 
opinion on whether or not the deliberate practice of using Africans as cannon fodder resulted in 
disproportionally high African casualties has been surprisingly polarized historically. However, 
more recent contributions to this debate largely support the beliefs that that the French military 
would have subjected African soldiers to more dangerous actions in order to sacrifice the ‘other’ 
before themselves, a viewpoint historical actors like Blaise Diagne16 and Charles Mangin both 
held.17 In all likelihood it was true that fatalities would be notably higher for tirailleurs 
sénégalais compared to their French counterparts. 
 
French West African Soldiers in World War I: During the war there were two areas 
West Africans found themselves fighting, inside German territories in Africa and on the Western 
Front in France. For the majority of enlisted Africans, experiences of World War I were confined 
to their home continent. Proportionally few enlisted men would actually go on to serve as 
frontline soldiers, let alone as soldiers in Europe. Instead, most were conscripted as carriers or 
porters, providing military labor for the European armies in Africa. However, a sizable number 
of colonial soldiers did find themselves drawn outside the continent for the first time in their 
lives. French military recruitment of West Africans for the Western Front began in earnest in 
1916 due to an increasingly strained and desperate military situation. In the case of most of the 
French colonial soldiers during World War I, ‘recruitment’ was a misnomer, if not an outright 
lie. Few West Africans willingly went off to fight for a cause they had little stake in and what for 
 
15 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 145 
 
16 Diagne, born in Gorée, was the first black African elected to the Chamber of Deputies of France. He represented 
the Four Communes, holding this position from 1914 until his death twenty years later. 
 
17 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 140-147 
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was assumed to be a death sentence. The vast majority of men went because they were coerced. 
West Africans were largely ‘recruited’ through African intermediaries. Chiefs, fearful of French 
retribution, helped fulfill local quotas through the begrudging sacrifice of “those deemed most 
expendable” to their collectives.18 Those considered the most socially dispensable tended to be 
domestic slaves, those lacking kinsmen, and later on younger siblings who found themselves 
given up in order to best maintain the structure of their families and communities. Pride, honor, 
sense of obedience to family and other social groups, as well as fear of reprisals to oneself and 
others were all common reasons men would accept this grim fate over possibly avoiding 
conscription. Resistance by communities was incredibly difficult at this time; those who 
attempted to revolt were usually quick to discover just how outmatched they were to fight back 
against French forces that held significant material and military advantages over them.19  
The one major exception to the forced enlistment of West Africans arose during the final 
year of the war via a recruiting drive spearheaded by Blaise Diagne, the first black African 
elected as a French Deputy and representative of Senegal’s Four Communes. Diagne argued for 
the originaires “right to be soldiers in the French army” instead of being segregated into separate 
units.20  Diagne accepted an appointment to recruit West Africans for the war effort in exchange 
for soldiers to receive political concessions and exemptions from many common obligations 
Africans faced under colonialism. An astounding 60,000 men voluntarily answered Diagne’s call 
to service in 1918, demonstrating that many Africans were willing to risk this lives for a 
 
18 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 41 
 
19 Ibid, 39-44, 49 
 
20 Balesi, From Adversaries to Comrades-in-Arms, 84-85 
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legitimate chance to received improved political rights.21 Diagne and the originaires aside, the 
overall impact of French conscription in West Africa was exceptionally severe even by the 
standards of its era.22As historians such as Philip Curtain have shown, the scale of French 
military recruitment in World War I was comparable, if not far greater than the exportation of 
people in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade centuries earlier. Curtain argues that there is 
“considerable justification in viewing the wartime recruitment of soldiers as the last, the largest, 
and the most inescapable “man hunt” in the history of Senegambia.”23 Overall, 135,000 West 
Africans conscripted into World War I would go on to serve on the Western Front.24 
For the West African soldiers who served overseas, World War I was not some abstract 
concept, but a lived reality for them just as it was for Europeans, one lived through and 
interpreted very differently by Africans. While Europeans struggled with the need to glorify the 
actions of Africans fighting and dying on their behalf while also reinforcing white supremacy, 
Africans had to navigate another system designed to exploit themselves. Simply getting to 
France was a challenge. The ocean voyage from West Africa to France was brutal both 
physically and mentally. Most of these men, who had never seen the ocean before, let alone been 
on a ship, now were confined to their cabins for the duration of the multi-week journey. Illness 
was common and many on board dealt with everything from seasickness to psychological issues. 
 
21 Lunn, “Kande Kamara Speaks,” 42-44 
 
22 Rathbone, “World War I and Africa,” 5 
 
23 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 47, 49 
 
24 Lunn, “Kande Kamara Speaks,” 28 
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Few had any idea where they were going or why they were to be fighting, leading to frequent 
fears they were actually heading off to be sold into slavery.25  
Despite France’s reputation amongst European nations as being much more open in their 
acceptance of black soldiers they still tried to segregate colonial troops like the tirailleurs as 
much as possible, both during combat and outside of battle.26 The conditions which West African 
conscripts fought under were extremely trying. The tirailleurs were often thrust into undertaking 
the most dangerous missions on the battlefield and those who refused orders or did not engage 
enemy troops risked being shot by their own officers. Forced into a situation where their only 
chance of survival could be achieved though fighting, nearly all colonial soldiers chose to fight.27 
Beyond self-preservation there were a number of additional reasons why Africans fought once 
they found themselves on the frontlines of the war. Personal pride and a desire to distinguish 
oneself amongst their peers and to Europeans provided incentive for some to go above and 
beyond what might have been expected. Later on, the originaires who came voluntarily had their 
own rights to fight for, giving them an extra sense of purpose those who had been forcibly 
conscripted did not possess.28 One thing that was not very effective motivating African soldiers 
was anti-German propaganda; while colonial soldiers were well aware of the animosity many 
Europeans held towards African people, due to their own circumstances they were more likely to 
view Germans as human beings just like themselves rather than buy into anti-German 
 
25 Lunn, “Kande Kamara Speaks,” 36-38 
 
26 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 161 
 
27 Ibid, 136-137; Lunn, “Kande Kamara Speaks,” 40-41 
 
28 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 137 
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messages.29 Military structure and combat alongside Europeans demonstrated to many West 
Africans a lack of difference between themselves and white people.30 Examples that particularly 
stood out for these colonial soldiers included exchanges where black soldiers had authority over 
white soldiers based on rank, heavily contrasting pre-war realities where Africans could not even 
look in the eyes of the French colonialists without risking serious retribution.31 
Outside of combat and the military hierarchy, the tirailleurs sénégalais had a variety of 
experiences with the civilians of France. Not all West African troops experienced French life the 
same way and quite a few never got meet French civilians at all. Those who did not get to 
interact with French civilians tended to be those whose units were highly segregated, especially 
those who came to Europe earlier on in the war.32 European militaries like the French felt a need 
to watch over and restrict the autonomy of their black colonial soldiers to a greater degree than 
other troops in order to ensure good behavior.33 These soldiers were also usually taught a pidgin 
form of French that further marked them as colonial subjects and kept them separated from the 
French.34 Furthermore, there were fears over the dangers of female sexuality amongst French 
women. Historian Philippa Levine’s article “Battle Colors” describes this phenomenon, writing:  
Women and black men were seen as unstable and unreliable because their actions defied 
the categories necessary to imperial stability. The ambivalence toward them, in many 
 
29 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 136 
 
30 Page, “Black Men in a White Man’s War,” 19 
 
31 Lunn, “Kande Kamara Speaks,” 45 
 
32 Ibid, 36-38 
 
33 Levine, “Battle Colors,” 115 
 
34 Fogarty, Race and War in France, 62 
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respects, was remarkably similar, for both could do serious damage to the empirê—most 
particularly via their sexual actions, the very root in Western philosophies of unreason. In 
war, both were at the same time indispensable to Allied success and a potential source of 
trouble. As a result, harsh controls, out of proportion even to the perceived level of 
problems, were used to bring them to order and – crucially – keep them apart.35 
Originaires tended to have the most contact with French people since they had a greater number 
of rights and typically understood the French language and customs more than the average 
tirailleur. 36 Whereas tirailleurs in general would not be allowed to take leave from the army 
until 1918, originaires were given this right a year prior.37 The stereotype of the ‘Africans as 
fearless warrior,’ an excuse for some to associate their race and masculinity to primitivism, did 
help with bring about positive receptions from quite a few French civilians.38 Beyond furloughs 
and leave, hospitals were the second most significant manner in which these soldiers interacted 
with French civilians. Wounds and higher military ranks helped soldiers receive support from 
many they interacted with, a far cry from their treatment by the French living in Africa.39 
Possibly the most interesting interactions between West Africans stationed in France and the 
country’s inhabitants came from the phenomena of marrines de guerre, who were essentially pen 
pals or girlfriends of soldiers. These bonds consisted of friendships and occasionally intimate 
relationships between the soldiers and French women, oftentimes nurses. Sympathetic and 
 
35 Levine, “Battle Colors,” 119 
 
36 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 173 
 
37 Ibid, 163 
 
38 Levine, “Battle Colors,” 115; Clark, West Africans at War, 9 
 
39 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 164, 168 
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compassionate to these men, they provided moral support during the war as well as another 
source of radical departure in treatment from prior African-European interactions in Africa. The 
marrines de guerre offered a way for soldiers to transcend established boundaries, racial or 
otherwise, and foster substantial connections with French individuals.40 
 
How World War I Shaped the Perceptions of West Africans: When World War I 
concluded and the tirailleurs sénégalais returned home, they “had been changed by the war, but 
the societies from which they had come, and the tenor of colonial life, had not.”41 Reflecting 
back on World War I years later, most tirailleurs stated they would not have re-enlisted if given 
the option.42 While around a fourth of the men claimed they still would have, usually citing 
martial pride or a masculine sense of duty as rationales, the vast majority of soldiers mentioned 
how terrible the war was and how they wanted no part of it.43  
West African soldiers came back not just with memories of the war but with a sizable 
amount of money as well due to a quarter of their pay being withheld until discharge.44 Most 
gave their earnings to their parents or guardians though a few did retain these funds for 
themselves, typically using the extra money to buy livestock or to marry early. These ex-soldiers 
were also were able to share knowledge of Europeans many of their community members were 
eager to hear about, partially circumventing the traditional structure of elder kinsmen holding a 
 
40 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 172-179 
 
41 Lunn, “Kande Kamara Speaks,” 46 
 
42 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 214-215 
 
43 Ibid, 215 
 
44 Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts, 23  
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monopoly on accepted knowledge. However, the vast majority of tirailleurs that came back from 
the war alive returned to their former homes and took up their previous ways of living.45 The 
desire to fit back into society after the war was prevalent throughout Africa, though those who 
served closer to home demonstrated an easier time readjusting to civilian life compared to the 
tirailleurs who saw action on the Western Front.46 World War I veterans did not function as 
major initiators of political activity like their World War II counterparts would, although they did 
play an important role building the foundation for those later developments.47 Shrewd 
communities in West Africa could and did use these soldiers as cultural intermediates and 
leveraged their knowledge for the own ends when dealing with the French, though this was 
typically the extent of their ‘subversive activities.’48  
The First World War, while not delineating as clear a turning point in African and world 
history as World War II, nonetheless brought about changes for both West Africans and 
Europeans in how they perceived one another and colonialism as a whole.49 For Europeans, 
World War I was shifted how many viewed colonialism as an institution. As Africanist Richard 
Rathbone describes, 
Before 1914 Africa was for the most part a dream for the greedy speculator. From 1918 it 
seems likely that her role was more centrally related, or at lease perceived to be more 
 
45 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 210 
 
46 Greenstein, “The Nandi Experience,” 92-93 
 
47 Ibid, 91-92 
 
48 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 192 
 
49 Rathbone, “World War I and Africa,” 1 
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centrally related, as part of the empire, to the very heart of the metropolitan economies 
themselves. 50 
For many French civilians and soldiers who encountered the tirailleurs, the war helped gradually 
push their views and perceptions of Africans in a positive direction towards an appreciated of 
their shared humanity.51 As a few historians such as Richard Fogarty have argued, amongst 
Westerners at the time World War I was seen as having “cemented France’s reputation as a 
color-blind society, especially in contrast with the prevailing racial climate in the United 
States.”52 Of course, there were very significant limits on just how far the French or any other 
European nation was willing to go towards accepting Africans as equals. The legacy of the war 
was seen by some in France as a vindication of Charles Mangin and the beliefs he espoused. 
Concerns about upholding “the future prestige of the white race” were frequent amongst 
Europeans of all nations recalling their service with Africans during World War I.53 For 
European soldiers fighting in Africa, the local inhabitants were seen as part of the background to 
such an extent that one European soldier’s account of his experiences grouped African people in 
a ‘Nature Notes’ section dedicated to the “the category of wild things” on the continent.54 The 
fact that historical records on cattle diseases in Africa around World War I are significantly more 
common than records on how diseases like human influenza affected Africans further speaks to 
how far European mindsets still were from seeing Africans as anything close to equals and where 
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their priorities remained.55 Furthermore, while World War I had increased the pace of changes 
taking place in the political, economic, and social spheres across Europe and Africa, after the war 
ended these changes slowed down to a crawl during the interwar period. The French very much 
feared and were probably correct in assuming that men such as Blaise Diagne could be disruptive 
forces against their established order of rule.56 
Unsurprisingly, the shift World War I had on West African perceptions of Europeans and 
colonialism differed greatly from European interpretations of the war. The experiences of the 
tirailleurs sénégalais stationed in France, while subject to their own differences in what they saw 
and how they reacted, nonetheless back up this shift in perceptions. Estimates from historian Joe 
Lunn hypothesize that around half of soldiers stationed overseas saw metropolitan French 
treatment as something different than a continuation of prior treatment in the colonies; though 
quite a few West African soldiers considered their service in the military as nothing more than an 
extreme permutation of the colonial system, a significant number of Africans ultimately did have 
their views altered because of their time as tirailleurs in World War I. Those who were able to 
meet and form deeper relations with a variety of French civilians and soldiers during the war 
were able to build “a much more sophisticated understanding of Europeans. In turn, this 
experience greatly transformed their earlier views of their colonial oppressors.”57 Important was 
that while those who were able to experience French citizens, society, and everyday life were a 
small proportion of the total number of West African soldiers who fought in World War I, they 
were not insignificant in number. Even on the lower end of estimates tens of thousands of West 
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Africans returned with the types of nuanced evaluations of the French that few would have 
thought possible just years before. In turn, they were able to share these experiences with many 
others in West Africa, experiences that provided a major assist in the expansion of accurate 
African knowledge on the French, colonialism, and their place within this greater system. As a 
whole, the experiences and resulting shifts in perception these West African soldiers underwent 
during World War I were both unique at the time and incredibly similar to what would be 
experienced by many more British colonial soldiers decades later in the Second World War, as 
seen in the next section. The soldiers of the tirailleurs sénégalais were not so sizable and 
influential as to have completely transformed perceptions of colonialism throughout West Africa 
yet they undoubtably helped lay the groundwork for a new generation of West Africans to later 
make claims to and re-contextualize.  
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Chapter Two: The King’s African Rifles Overseas in World War II 
 
After the First World War, Africans continued to be exploited by a variety of European 
colonial military regiments, one such outfit being the British King’s African Rifles. Studying the 
history, legacy, and lasting implications of this particular colonial military organization aims to 
reveal how military institutions like the KAR worked to reinforce colonial rule not just through 
the monopolization of violence, but through control over social identity as well. Both British and 
African accounts of service in the King’s African Rifles are examined, with the most significant 
disparities in how they viewed themselves, each other, and their military service as a whole 
highlighted. I hope to show how the structure and service of a regiment like the KAR worked to 
first keep the colonial system intact on African soil despite an apparent multitude of inherent 
tensions and contradictory policies, then later helped play a role in the eventual downfall of 
colonialism in Kenya after the Second World War. The body of this second chapter has also been 
divided into three main sections. It begins with a history and general overview of the KAR, 
providing background and context for the arguments posed above. The second section is an 
analysis of viewpoints held by the British and Africans who fought in the KAR, given to 
showcase how service within the regiment meant very different things for these two groups. 
Finally, the last section concentrates on delivering evidence which proves that, despite the 
existence of what appeared to be multiple intrinsically fatal issues with using a colonial military, 
the KAR at first did not act as an influence to split the colonial system but rather was an integral 
force holding together colonial Africa both militarily and socially until after World War II. 
 
Historical Background of the King’s African Rifles: To better understand how a 
colonial regiment like the King’s African Rifles helped to reinforce and eventually subvert the 
21 
 
empire it served. The story of the King’s African Rifles can be understood as having unfolded 
over six successive periods: the buildup to the regiment’s formal establishment in 1902, the 
consolidation of the KAR in East Africa prior to World War I, World War I, the interwar period, 
World War II, and from the end of World War II until the fracturing and ultimate dissolution of 
the KAR in the early 1960s. With the ‘Scramble for Africa’ encouraging heavy territorial 
expansion in a race to establish colonial control, European powers like Great Britain saw a much 
greater need to possess armed forces that were not just capable of defending older coastal 
enclaves like before but who could also go on the offensive and effectively control new 
territorial claims. Prior to the establishment of the King’s African Rifles in 1902, several native 
military forces were already operating within British East and Central Africa: these were the 
Central Africa Regiment, the Uganda Rifles, and the East Africa Rifles.58 Originally these units 
mainly consisted of foreign soldiers sent over from British India since they were both cheaper 
and more resistant to disease than their metropolitan British counterparts.59 African troops 
consisted of an slowly growing portion of these new regiments, though for some time the Indian 
troops remained the backbone of their operations; for example, in 1893 the Central Africa 
Regiment comprised of a mix between “three British officers, 200 Sikhs, 150 native regulars, 
and a varying number of irregular levies.”60 However, these Indian troops were seen by the 
British a stop gap, an improvement on employing British soldiers in the rank-and-file but still not 
considered as economical or hardy as African soldiers.61 Furthermore, given the necessity of the 
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protectorates to gain approval from the British War Office each and every time they needed to 
procure British or Indian troops, as well as the fact they were for the most part in charge of 
funding their own defense, a turn to native troops made sense.62 Inspired by the consolidation of 
local forces in West Africa as the West African Frontier Forces in 1897, these three precursor 
units were combined and centralized on January 1st of 1902 as the King’s African Rifles.63 Even 
after this official union the operations and overall police, military, and civil administrative work 
of the KAR effectively remained unchanged.64  
   World War I brought an immediate end to these early trends, introducing a significant 
and pressing need for manpower and rapidly transforming the King’s African Rifles into a 
modern military regiment. At the outbreak of the war the three battalions comprising the KAR 
had just 2,325 askaris65 and 73 British soldiers and were notably lacking in adequate weaponry; 
by the end of WWI nearly 3,500 British officers and NCOs and 32,000 askari were concurrently 
enlisted in the KAR and served in the East African Campaign.66 The soldiers of the King’s 
African Rifles who joined the regiment during this time generally viewed themselves as 
mercenaries fighting in order to earn a living wage.67 Loyalty existed to their fellow KAR 
soldiers but not to the British crown and there were cases of askari soldiers fighting for both the 
British and German armies in World War I, depending on who was offering the best terms of 
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service.68 For many poor or unskilled Africans, service in the KAR was amongst the best options 
available during the colonial period: wages were typically several times higher than other 
unskilled positions, tax exemptions existed for those who served, and the prestige that came 
along with a position as a soldier in the KAR were all significant factors that influenced 
service.69 Additionally, 494,936 carriers were officially recruited or conscripted as part the 
service, around 40,000 of whom died from disease or warfare.70 Unlike with the KAR soldiers, 
incentives to join as a carrier were virtually nonexistent; in fact, most were forcibly conscripted 
in a similar manner to what took place in West Africa. The notion of prestige and the position of 
soldiers within the colonial society at large was an important point for askari; while the 
European system imposed on Africa was difficult for virtually all native subjects, KAR soldiers 
were relatively better off than most of their peers. With the exception of a few educated fighters 
who joined during the Second World War, KAR soldiers tended to view themselves as distinct 
from and generally superior to the general native populace as well as those natives who served in 
non-combatant colonial military units like the carrier corps.71 
 After the war, demobilization and the need to occupy former German territory in 
Tanganyika led to reorganizing the KAR into six battalions totaling some 5,700 Africans and 
150 British officers and NCOs in 1920.72 This number subsequently declined throughout the 
years; by 1930 no metropolitan British soldiers were stationed south of Khartoum and in all of 
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Britain’s sub-Saharan colonies there were less than 12,000 locally recruited soldiers, just over 
3,000 of whom were in the KAR.73 Driven by the continuing global economic crisis, three years 
later the strength of the whole regiment would shrink to just 2,400 soldiers compared to a 
population of 12 million in the territories they watched over.74 Nonetheless, the King’s African 
Rifles played a critical role in internal defense during interwar period, patrolling frontier lands 
and once again undertaking punitive expeditions, albeit on a smaller scale than during the pre-
WWI years.75 The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935-1936 brought a quick reversal to this 
trend of declining military strength in the colonies: a seventh KAR battalion was created in 
Uganda, reserve forces were prepared, and the KAR readied external defensive plans in the 
following years.76 
Generally speaking, British perceptions of Africans stagnated during the interwar period; 
as historian Philip Curtin describes, the result of First World War on Europe “was a kind of 
historical hiatus, where many trends and developments that seemed imminent before 1914 
simply failed to take place until after 1914, and the Great Depression of the 1930s was a further 
damper on innovation.”77 The average British KAR officer and NCO considered Africans in the 
KAR to be brute fighters, capable of following orders but who needed European leaders in order 
to operate most effectively. The soldiers in the King’s African Rifles were seen as having simple 
needs, a generally cheerful outlook, and capable of deep loyalty to those who earned their 
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respect. While they could be good soldiers, they believed the askaris would always be inferior to 
the European counterparts.78 They were also noted for their exceptional reconnaissance skills, 
something Nunneley elaborates on: 
Although few East African tribes are familiar with the jungle, belonging more to the open 
spaces – the plains and the hills and the desert regions – their acute powers of observation 
seem to make them equally good trackers in the jungle as elsewhere.79 
Overall, their views could be described as paternalistic; while some of their descriptions of the 
askaris were condescending and contained back-handed praises, the majority of British officers 
and NCOs sincerely believed they were helping with their actions.80 The notion of promoting 
European concepts of civilization is common throughout these sources, especially in the older 
and more official documents. However, even in the most explicitly pro-European sources they 
were never outright hostile in their opinions of the askari who served in the KAR. Like the 
French, the British also saw Africans who served in their military ranks through the conceptual 
lens of ‘martial races.’ In principle, this concept espoused that certain groups of people or 
societies were particularly well-suited for warfare and would make the best recruits for military 
service under the British. The designation of martial race originated in British India during the 
mid-nineteenth century and, by the time the KAR was established in 1902, the term was deeply-
entrenched into the official military lexicon and the British imperial imaginary more broadly.81 
As such, the askari who filled the ranks of the KAR throughout its history were seen by the 
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British serving with them as superior to other Africans from other, non-martial groups within 
East Africa. 
 
  The King’s African Rifles in World War II: The Second World War saw the King’s 
African Rifles become involved with three separate military campaigns: against Italy in Ethiopia 
and Somalia, against Vichy (occupied) France in Madagascar, and against the Japanese in 
Burma. The KAR again rapidly grew in strength, quadrupling its number of battalions by May of 
1942 and passing the regiment’s highest figures from World War I soon after.82 The Burma 
campaign was particularly notable, with the KAR fighting outside the African continent for the 
first time in their history. In total, well over 300,000 East African natives were recruited for 
service in all branches of the British military during World War II, including around a quarter of 
whom served overseas and nearly 13,000 that were still fighting the Japanese when the war 
ended.83   
Unlike typical British views of colonial soldiers, which are widely available in print, 
exploring how Africans serving in the King’s African Rifles perceived their British counterparts 
prior to and during World War II requires a more complicated course of study. Historian David 
Killingray points out this phenomenon, stating, 
The historiography of the military forces in colonial Africa, inevitably, rests heavily on the 
official and private documents, memoirs and letters generated by the white men who served 
as officers and administrators… [African] Soldiers were mainly non-literate and until the 
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Second World War when a good number a literate men were recruited, there are few letters 
or accounts by Africans.84 
Furthermore, the few accounts that were created by African soldiers require accounting for the 
rarity of such well-educated men in the rank and file and how their experiences differed from 
their more common illiterate askari counterparts. However, a general sense of how the KAR rank 
and file viewed themselves, their European counterparts, and KAR military service as a whole 
can be synthesized and compared to the aforementioned British understandings by placing these 
few available primary sources in conversation with more recent scholarly work undertaken to 
understand the KAR from the African point of view. 
Prior to World War II, soldiers of the King’s African Rifles largely accepted and even 
helped foster notions of martial identity and superiority, using it to their advantage when 
negotiating for concessions from the British as well as to differentiating themselves from other 
Africans. At the same time, Africans who wished to volunteer for the KAR but were not 
considered by the British as belonging to a martial race simply lied about their ethnic affiliations 
to gain admittance, demonstrating a flexible and pragmatic approach to the situation. Given its 
stature as a downright fictional classification, which groups were considered to be martial races 
was unsurprisingly subject to change over time.85 In terms of representation, ethnic groups in the 
KAR fluctuated significantly throughout the years. One extreme example of this were the 
Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru in the Kenyan KAR battalions, who went from 0.1% of the force in 
1938 to 21.7% of it in 1945, only to shrink back down to 3.3% by 1959.86 Other times they were 
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barely represented at all. Oftentimes these groups did not even view themselves as a unified 
ethnic group until after being categorized that way by Europeans.87  
Despite the strictness of military service and the rigid structure that put whites in superior 
positions to their African colleagues, KAR askari also found ways to express agency within the 
ranks themselves. Some would feign illness and dehydration during long marches to get sick 
leave, others would make up stories about how they were needed back at their homes and create 
schemes to get breaks from service.88 While the official British documents ignore the issue, KAR 
British officers noted there were even not-so-infrequent cases of askari rebelling against and 
murdering individual officers.89 Ultimately, however, there was a grudging recognition that their 
European officers and NCOs held power in the relationship; as one ex-KAR askari put it, “we 
knew that they were white men and whatever they said had to be obeyed. That was just the way 
it was.”90  
 
How World War II Shaped the Perceptions of East Africans: Thanks to the 
experiences of King’s African Rifles soldiers overseas, a number of tensions and contradictions 
inherent to the KAR would surface in ways that challenged the established colonial order. 
Differing perceptions of military service in the KAR by the British and Africans were just one of 
the many fundamental issues and concerns with the KAR and its role in colonialism. The KAR 
askari were the only Africans legally authorized to use lethal force and therefore held an 
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important role upholding the colonial system. Without the King’s African Rifles, military 
enforcement in the British East and Central African territories they served would have been 
prohibitively expensive. No matter how the British justified this, they were ultimately dependent 
on using a portion of the subjugated colonial population to control themselves, a situation the 
British were all too aware of and constantly worried about. Encouraging KAR soldiers to view 
themselves as different from the general populace while serving, then having these soldiers be 
re-introduced back into civilian life was another tension the British contended with. While they 
greatly feared what ex-soldiers were capable of, especially when they had to introduce large 
numbers of them back into the populace like at end of World War II, the protectorates more or 
less agreed that preferential treatment for ex-soldiers would be just as dangerous.91  
Given these precarious foundations, it seems fair to assume that the King’s African Rifles 
should have had some very real problems working as an agent of colonialism and perhaps even 
could have been expected to help delegitimize the colonial system. Some modern interpretations 
of the KAR’s legacy are based off this idea of the KAR functioning as a source of colonial 
destabilization. In a centennial history produced by the Malawi Rifles, a successor of the KAR, it 
is mentioned about how the 1915 Chilembwe Uprising “broke the myth and raised questions of 
the invincibility of the white race which would later become a source of inspiration in the fight 
for independence.”92 The Malawi Rifles document also goes on to state that, while the KAR was 
initially tasked with enforcing colonial occupation, “later, many who served in KAR were useful 
in organizing military insurrection and commando operations against colonial governments.” 93 
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Subsequent uprisings like the Mau Mau Rebellion in colonial Kenya, which was recognized for 
having ex-KAR soldiers such as Waruhiu Itote leading rebel forces, provide examples of how the 
KAR did help foster counter-colonial operations and attitudes. 
Most of these perceived issues did not materialize into tangible problems until after the 
Second World War. For all these apparent problems with the King’s African Rifles, its system of 
military rule endured with little indication of undermining colonial institutions for the majority 
of British rule in Central and East Africa. Even in the few notable examples of ex-KAR soldiers 
leading movements against colonial rule like in the Chilembwe Uprising, the KAR ultimately put 
down the uprising and executed its leaders.94  The fundamental tensions and contradictions 
brought on from the use of African troops as a cornerstone of the colonial military, and the 
volatility of martial race as an identity were manageable for some time during WWII, proving 
beneficial to the creation and maintenance of the status-quo in these British territories. Only the 
‘winds of change’ brought on by a shift post-World War Two landscape and others forces largely 
outside the KAR’s control created a formula under which these incongruities became an issue. 
For example, the concept of martial races was a flawed and arbitrary notion that was nonetheless 
perpetuated by the British and, due to pressures imposed by colonialism, to a lesser extent by 
Africans themselves. In practice, the designation of martial race more or less came down to 
which local groups were minorities and non-rebellious. These groups would then be designated 
‘martial’ and the communities given special status.95 It was not a coincidence that African 
societies like the Maasai, who could obtain some degree of prosperity within their own 
communities and thus had little incentive to join the KAR, were seen as rebellious and never 
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classified as martial by the British despite their historical reputation as “warriors” amongst other 
Africans in Kenya.96 Most groups were not in such fortuitous situations however, leading 
individuals to volunteer for the KAR and tribal leaders to use marital status as a means for 
consolidating their own power. Chiefs would use the “thin veneer” of martial identity to 
negotiate with and extract wealth from the colonial state, which it then would to introduce back 
into their communities.97 Leaders in ethnic groups like the Kamba were therefore encouraged to 
create and foster a shared ethnic identity within this martial framework, since by playing on their 
reputation as a martial race and their loyalty to the British they gained a bargaining position 
allowing them to push the colonial administration for new educational facilities, business 
permits, markets, and other concessions.98 However, this bargaining power was only used within 
the colonial system, not against it. As Myles Osborne points out, 
On one level, the veterans were frustrated with the colonial administration: They believed 
British officials had failed to adequately compensate them for the sacrifices they had 
made during the war. But their crosshairs were even more firmly fixed on the existing 
chiefs, headmen, and councilors, whose “easy tyranny” had caused untold stresses and 
problems in the villages.99 
Ethnic groups that served in the KAR certainly had their issues with the British 
authorities, but their primary grievances tended to be with their own leaders and activism rarely 
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extended beyond local issues.100 Martial race designations may have been unstable, but they 
proved to be flexible and encouraged different colonial subjects to divide themselves into 
manageable groupings that had incentive to compete amongst themselves for access to the 
resources of the colonial state. 
 There were a few King’s African Rifles soldiers who did argue that service in the 
colonial military fundamentally changed Africans views and awakened soldiers to pan-African 
ideals, perhaps most notably Robert Kakembo in his work An African Soldier Speaks. 
Now, during this war, not only do we meet men from other parts of Africa, but we have 
been up and down those countries. It will be recorded by historians that it was during the 
war that the African started to think more in terms of a race than as a tribe. The words 
‘the African’, ‘the Native’, are showing us that we are all one and the same race. We 
suffer the same privations, we are treated in the same way. We have begun to think 
together as a race.101  
Kakembo’s words fell right in line with some of the worst fears the British had following World 
War Two. Specifically, the British were terrified that the experiences of askari serving overseas 
would lead them to reject going back to the pre-war status quo and throw the colonial system 
into disarray. The British government considered re-integration of ex-soldiers to be a touchy and 
potentially huge issue; the idea was that introducing small numbers of troops in the interwar 
period had been manageable but doing so on an exponentially larger scale could spell disaster. 
While the colonial government worried about re-integration, they did their best to keep their 
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concerns hidden from the public. A 1945 article in The Spectator, a British newspaper speaks to 
the general population’s obliviousness on the issue:  
In Burma they have seen all the machinery of war. They have been shelled and machine-
gunned, mortared and ambushed. They met civilisation through the medium of 
destructive weapons, and, like all other soldiers, have developed a philosophy for high 
explosives. They are still simple-hearted, and when they graze their cattle again in the 
thorn country of Africa, the war in Burma will fade like an old dream.102 
The British colonial government ended up spending significant time preparing for the inevitable 
return of the KAR soldiers after World War II, carefully implementing a demobilization plan 
over several years that gave educated ex-KAR soldiers improved job opportunities while trying 
to prevent those without an education from gaining one and getting the ex-soldiers to go back to 
their homelands.103 Kakembo validated many of these fears, especially when talking about how 
the ex-KAR soldier would expect his standard of living to stay the same as it had been during the 
war and how their overseas service showed the askari that East African Whites treated them 
much worse than other British soldiers.104  
Still, the KAR remained an important colonial institution that kept the Central and East 
African protectorates together until its eventual disbandment. As sociologist Frank Furedi 
argues, imperial concern over demobilization and the attitudes of ex-soldiers was exaggerated 
and overblown; if anything, “the imaginary problem of the demobilized soldier was essentially 
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the real problem of imperial self-confidence.”105 The issues the British expected to have 
returning massive numbers of ex-soldiers back to low-paying jobs never materialized on quite 
the scale they had anticipated for the First World War, while in the Second World War the issues 
went far beyond just ex-soldiers finding employment. The bigger problem wasn’t so much the 
rapid discharging of large numbers of soldiers but the types of men the King’s African Rifles had 
enlisted in the first place. For most of the interwar period, the men who comprised the the KAR 
infantry largely sought out the profession, acting as career soldiers and serving for nine to 
eighteen years in order to get benefits; in contrast, the Second World War drew in thousands of 
men to the KAR who had little or no desire to be professional or even temporary soldiers.106 
These soldiers, often literally forced into the fray, tended to be much more bitter in the 
recollection of the KAR and colonial Britain. However, the colonial government in East Africa 
held rigid control of ex-askari organizations, limiting their ability to have political influence after 
World War II. KAR soldiers had few commonalities uniting them after the war; for example, the 
large and politically active Kenya African Union (KAU) was supported by many Kikuyu and a 
few Kamba veterans but few other ethnic groups.107 The Kikuyu veterans in general were a 
notable exception to the fact that most ex-soldiers were largely unrepresented in African 
nationalist movements. The Kikuyu were classified as a non-martial group and subsequently 
ignored by the colonial government, leaving them with little support and leading many to join 
organizations such as the KAU and the Forty Group, both of which had ties to leading military 
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figures in the Mau Mau Uprising.108 Several Kenya Land Freedom Army leaders such as 
Waruhiu Itote (General China) and Dedan Kimathi (General Russia) were in fact ex-soldiers 
from World War II and their KAR service was for a long time used as an explanation for their 
later military accomplishments. However, in spite of this traditional rationale for their prowess in 
the field virtually all of these men served in labor or specialist units within the KAR, not 
overseas on the frontlines of the Second World War.109 Furthermore, King’s African Rifles 
forces were actually called upon to supplement the imperial British army in suppressing the Mau 
Mau rebellion, and all four Kenyan KAR battalions were used in addition to battalions from 
Uganda and Tanganyika.110 A sizeable number of veteran KAR soldiers did take part in the Mau 
Mau Uprising, but it was also true that there were a number of veterans who remained loyalists 
in the conflict as well.111  
Outside of the ex-soldiers who went on to be a part of the Mau Mau Uprising’s military 
apparatus, few KAR soldiers would go on to directly challenge colonial authority via taking up 
arms. Additionally, ideological challenges from educated KAR soldiers such as Kakembo still 
proved an exception, not the norm, as most KAR soldiers came into the service with little 
education. For the few literate and articulate Africans, service in the KAR during World War II 
did provide a substantial platform for them to see and do everything the British had feared, but it 
was their academic background, not soldiery that was at the root of this issue. Timothy Parsons 
again sums things well, stating, “education in the colonial forces was a double-edged sword. 
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While it was an innovative method of controlling African soldiers, it also provided an effective 
means of articulating their grievances.”112 However, very few soldiers in the King’s African 
Rifles were as well-schooled as Kakembo and, similar to the tirailleurs in World War I, 
grievances for a large majority of the KAR rank-and-file remained limited to their immediate 
communities.113 Those who were educated tended not to serve overseas but rather in more 
auxiliary roles where their previous tutelage could be put to better use. For its part, the KAR 
continued to promote a sense of loyalty through martial identity as well as through intergroup 
competition for resources within the British colonial framework. The relative prosperity offered 
to soldiers in the King’s African Rifles and the allegedly martial communities they came from 
ultimately resulted in non-conscripted KAR soldiers being some of the most reliable East 
Africans for upholding British rule.114  
As a whole, overseas service did not do as much for political movements and tangible 
change as other factors such as economic issues, ethnic ties, and global forces. Many of the 
King’s African Rifle’s soldiers who served abroad were impacted on a personal level and 
underwent changes in their perceptions of the British, the colonial system they were a part of, 
and their place in world affairs; however, how these new understandings translated into tangible 
action was heavily dependent on these other factors. This sort of overseas service was 
undoubtably impactful on the perceptions of soldiers who experienced it, and to some of those 
they came in direct contact with afterwards, but not very significant in the greater 
decolonialization process. Those who would go on to play a major role in such activities were 
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the KAR regulars who either were educated or served in non-combat roles, neither of whom 
went overseas in great numbers. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
 
 Overall, what conclusions from a comparative perspective can be reached from 
evaluating the overseas campaigns of the tirailleurs sénégalais and King’s African Rifles in the 
Two World Wars? To begin, it can safely be claimed that overseas service opened up 
opportunities for colonial soldiers in both these units to obtain a richer intellectual understanding 
of Europeans, colonialism, and their relation to both. While no two men experienced or 
interpreted their time away from home in quite the same manner, frequent interactions with 
foreign civilians and European soldiers offered African combatants’ chances to communicate 
with and learn from these people in ways they never could back home. Many of these colonial 
soldiers were able to take advantage of their situation. From the vantage points of Europe and 
Asia it became easier to see how hypocritical the colonial system in Africa was, how their daily 
lives under such regimes compared unfavorably to virtually everywhere else, and how most of 
the outside world was unaware of the extensive negative impact these colonial governments had 
on so many Africans. In short, overseas service provided a path for Africans to gain deeper 
perspectives on the ways colonialism worked to suppress and deny the rich history of the African 
continent, overlaying this reality with a web of lies needed to justify European exploitation of the 
land and those living on it. 
Perhaps more importantly, channeling these new understandings and altered perceptions 
into successful challenges of the colonial system proved to be a much more difficult task. One 
complicating issue was that those exposed to overseas military service typically were not those 
who could best take advantage of what they learned. It was rarely the highly educated who found 
themselves fighting the Germans and Japanese overseas; rather, those from lower status 
backgrounds and who had limited means to avoid military conscription ended up filling the vast 
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majority of tirailleur and KAR positions during the two World Wars. Another issue was that the 
military roles occupied by the men of these two colonial units were extremely hazardous. 
Frontline combat roles were already dangerous and had exceptionally high casualty rates. 
Additionally, it is exceedingly plausible that the men of the tirailleurs sénégalais and King’s 
African Rifles were even more likely to be forced into in dangerous military operations due to 
their race. A lot of these soldiers would not return home alive and, out of those who did survive, 
few had any appetite for fighting after their military service concluded; most simply wanted to 
get back home and return to their way of life, albeit with a bit more money, prestige, and 
understanding of the way their world worked. Any colonial soldiers that returned back to Africa 
after their service and made efforts to change the established order found their efforts stifled by 
colonial governments that overestimated but nonetheless anticipated and prepared for difficulties 
reintegrating such soldiers back into society.  
In the end, the overseas experiences shared by the soldiers of the tirailleurs sénégalais 
and King’s African Rifles make up a unique and underappreciated slice of African history. Their 
impact subverting the colonial systems they inhabited was not overwhelming, yet these 
experiences also proved to be far from inconsequential. Colonial soldiers that served overseas 
helped immensely with broadening African worldviews at a time when such observations were at 
a premium. The messages and information being shared Africans in these colonial systems were 
mirrored reflections of reality, warped images given to justify and mask the inequalities of the 
colonial order.  What the overseas service of African soldiers in the Two World Wars provided 
was a means to recognize their existence did not need to be a reflection of European projections; 
service offered a way to see the world from a more nuanced point of view, one from which these 
soldiers could take a figurative step back and appreciate the full truth of their situation as 
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colonial subjects. By going overseas, they were able to realize their colonial experiences in 
Africa were not just ‘the way things were’ or the natural order of things but instead a very 
particular and unnatural system of rule imposed on them. These experiences also exposed bare 
many of the hypocrisies colonialism fostered, in particular that colonial soldiers were essentially 
serving to protect nations that, in turn, screwed them over. From outside their home continent, it 
became clear to many African soldiers how much of a caustic aberration colonialism really was. 
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